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Both	 industrial	 and	 agricultural	 products	 fall	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 TBT	 and	 SPS	
Agreements.	But	in	practice	there	is	a	strong	dominance	of	agricultural	products	in	the	




made	 on	 domestic	 support	 and	 market	 access	 under	 the	 1995	 WTO	 Agreement	 on	
Agriculture	would	not	be	undermined	by	other	types	of	non‐tariff	barriers.	For	the	TBT	
Agreement,	about	30%	of	the	products	affected	by	trade	concerns	raised	for	discussion	
                                                 
1 These are measures applied address risks:  (i) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the 
Member from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms 
or disease-causing organisms;  (ii) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member 
from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or 
feedstuffs;  (iii) to protect human life or health within the territory of the  Member from risks arising from 
diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread of pests;  or 
(iv) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the  Member from the entry, establishment or spread 
of pests.  A footnote to the word  ‘Definitions’ in  Annex A of the SPS Agreement states that for the purpose of 
these definitions, ‘animal’ includes fish and wild fauna;  ‘plant’ includes forests and wild flora;  ‘pests’ include 
weeds;  and ‘contaminants’ include pesticide and veterinary drug residues and extraneous matter  (SPS  
Agreement, Annex A, Definitions, para 1). 
 
2 TBT §1.5 and SPS §1.4. 
 
3 WTO WTR 2012, Section C.2(d), p.116.  This reflects data from 1995 – 2011 and for those STCs in the SPS 






























                                                 
4 TBT §13.1. 
5 SPS §12.2. 























                                                 
7 WTO Doc. G/TBT/1/Rev.10, page 43. 
8 Puig and al Haddab (2011). 
9 There are, of course, other aspects of transparency covered by these two Agreements parallel to notificaiton 
requirements.  For instance, Members have to establish ‘enquiry points’ (TBT §10.1 and SPS Annex B, §3) 
which serve as national focal points for information exchange on standards and regulatory matters that affect 
trade.  Enquiry points are meant to be one stop shops to facilitate communication both within and among 
countries on TBT and SPS matters. Traders can ask questions about both existing as well as future measures and 
obtain information without implicating their governments at all (unlike the paradigm for the overwhelming 
majority of WTO law). Biukovic (2008), and Bacchetta et al. (2012) discuss in detail the system of WTO 
notifications. Transparency obligations increasingly become the subject-matter of formal disputes. So far 
nevertheless, case law has limited itself to claims regarding the consistency of national measures with the general 



























                                                 
10 SPS §7 and Annex B, §5 and TBT §2.9 and §5.6.  The presumption is that those measures that are based on 
international standards will not unnecessarily restrict international trade. 
11 These figures includes all notifications (both regular and emergency), including revisions – but excluding 
addenda and corrigenda.  For TBT, the figures are drawn from G/TBT/33, paragraph 2.1.  For SPS, the figures 
are drawn from I-TIP (http://i-tip.wto.org/). 
12 As Collin-Williams and Wolffe (2010) point out, since notification of TBT or SPS measures is not necessarily 
self-incriminating, Members should have stronger incentives to notify these than e.g. subsidies or import 
licensing measures. Downs (2012) argues that transparency may also lead to regulatory chill and under-
regulation where doubts are raised on the consistency of notified measure with assumed obligations. 
 












                                                 
14 Lang and Scott (2009) discuss STCs from a different perspective, for instance pointing to how this mechanism 
promotes trans-national governance.  
 

























                                                 
16 REACH is the European Union Regulation that governs the safe use of chemicals (EC 1907/2006). It entered 
into force on 1 June 2007 and deals with the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemical 
substances (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/reach/reach_intro.htm).  It was first raised in the TBT 































                                                 
17 Appendix 1 gives a complete classification of all WTO Members that have participated on either side of an 


















































	 BRIC DEV G2 IND Total	
BRIC 0.4 0.3 7.53 1.0 9.3
DEV	 2.9 3.3 13.3 4.3 23.8	
G2	 11.0 9.4 5.05 8.3 33.7	
IND	 6.1 5.8 13.51 6.7 32.1	
LDC	 0.3 0.0 0 0.8 1.1







	 BRIC DEV G2 IND LDC Total	
BRIC	 0.6 2.3 5.8 3.5 0.1 12.3	
DEV	 1.5 4.8 17.5 8.2 0.0 32.0	
G2	 4.8 7.6 4.5 8.8 0.0 25.6	
IND	 2.7 8.4 7.3 11.0 0.0 29.4	
LDC	 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.7	































                                                 
18Horn et al. (2011).  
19Horn et al. (2011).  


















                                                 
21 Approximating the development of the TBT STCs with a linear trend, the yearly increase in the number of 
































                                                 









































                                                 
23 By ‘fully-fledged’ we mean disputes where Panel and/or Appellate Body Reports have been issued and where 































                                                 
24 It is notable that in the year 2012 alone, 1,023 notifications under the TBT Agreement mentioned the objective 
of the ‘protection of human health or safety’ (66% of all notifications); for ‘protection of the environment’ the 



















































Objective SPS TBT Both	
Env	but	not	health 25 13 19
Health	but	not	environment 48 33 40
Env	and	health 3 11 7
Neither	 24 43 34















                                                 



















































































                                                 
27 Both variables are significant however in the TBT case, if the data also includes STCs with fewer than three 
meetings. In this case, they variables are positive, and the estimates suggest that an STC that addresses 


























































                                                 
28 Formally, an STC is also considered resolved when the matter has gone to a DSU Panel. However, in practice 
there is not a single case where this has occurred. It can also be noted that legally it is yet not clear whether 
‘resolution’ before the Committee amounts to formal resolution to the effect that, for example, none of the 
parties can raise this matter again before a WTO Panel. But practice so far thus suggests that WTO Members 























































































‘Resolved’	according	to	Committee	records ሺofficialሻ 46 42.6	




                                                 
34 Indeed, looking at STCs with one meeting only, 116 out of 137, or 85%, are listed as “Not reported”. One 
plausible explanation for the considerably lower frequency for reported resolutions for STCs that have been 
raised only in one or two meetings may be that the subject matters of these STCS are not viewed as important 
enough to merit further engagement. 
 
35 The fact that the 123 STCs include 3 that were initiated during 2011 and 2012 implies that the rate of 






























                                                 
36The difference between the two agreements in this respect is remarkable, but we have still not found any 
persuasive explanation of the discrepancy.  

































nevertheless believe that the basic message they convey – that a significant number of serious 







































































































































































2	 SPS	 Australia	–	Apples	ሺNew	Zealandሻ 31	August	2007	 DS367
                                                 
39 A full listing of these cases can be found on the WTO website under "Disputes by Agreement". 
40 Disputes currently ‘in the pipeline’ (where no Panel  and/or AB report has been adopted) that may become 





















































 SPS TBT 
VARIABLES # Meetings # Meetings 
   
# Concerned 0.300** 0.405*** 
 (0.120) (0.130) 
# Respond 0.477*** -0.0888 
 (0.137) (0.481) 
Env -0.397 1.117** 
 (0.408) (0.524) 
Eealth -0.685* 0.994* 
 (0.354) (0.516) 
Constant 3.450*** 2.919*** 
 (0.435) (0.524) 
   
Observations 108 78 
R-squared 0.205 0.221 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
	
